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Abstract One reason for market failure is the inherent com-
plexity that excludes non-sophisticated users. Market complex-
ity can be reduced by adapting the market rules or by simpli-
fying the user interface. Just recently researchers started to
address this topic and identified the need to merge market and
interface design. Thus far it remains unclear how to design user-
centric market interfaces. In a prediction market for economic
variables, traders can customize their trading interface accord-
ing to their informational needs. Surprisingly, we show that on
average an increase in information reduces trading perfor-
mance. An explanation for this effect might lie in cognitive
theory. Displaying more information increases the participants’
cognitive load and hence might reduce trading performance.
We are able to distinguish between trading behaviour and
performance and thereby provide insight into the interplay
between information and decision making. Finally, we also
track the influence of individual information elements and
identify those that improve or decrease trading performance.
Keywords Market Design . Trading Interfaces . Prediction
Markets
JELss classification . D47 . C53 . G14
Introduction
The Internet has increased the number of complex markets
(e.g. Energy or P2P resource sharing, sports betting platforms)
dramatically. One reason why non-sophisticated users might
have difficulties interacting with such markets is the amount
of information they have to cope with. Addressing this prob-
lem, researchers have identified the need to merge interface
and market design (Seuken et al. 2010a). The main idea is to
hide or reduce market complexities while maintaining eco-
nomic efficiency. One way to accomplish this is to simplify
the market interface. To do so, one needs to understand which
information elements support and which elements hinder the
individual trading process. Moreover, as individuals have
different informational needs and vary in experience, it seems
fruitful to develop customizable market interfaces.
As a follow-up to Teschner et al. (2012), we study a
prediction market called Economic Indicator Exchange
(EIX), which forecasts economic indicators such as GDP,
inflation, investments, export and unemployment figures in
Germany. The basic idea of prediction markets is to trade
contracts whose payoffs depend on the outcome of future
events. Market participants form expectations about the out-
come of an event (e.g. the economic growth in the next
quarter). Comparable to trading on financial markets, they
buy if they find that prices underestimate the event in question
and they sell if they find that prices overestimate the proba-
bility of an event. The advantages of this research setting are
twofold. Firstly, from an individual perspective, market par-
ticipants interact in a repeated decision-making environment
closely resembling decision making in financial markets.
Secondly, as the outcomes of events in prediction markets
are finally known, we can ex-post measure the participants’
trading performance. This study differs from Teschner et al.
(2012) in two ways. First, we do not examine information
usage in a mobile app setting but in a web setting. Second, this
study does not only present conceptual ideas, but instead
additionally analyses information usage and trade data. In
contrast to financial market research we have full data access
to the whole trading universe linked to individual trading
portfolios and additionally can measure the individual usage
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of the trading interface. We conduct a field experiment with
more than 800 participants and over 75,000 trading decisions,
in which participants can individually customize their trading
interface. The trading interface consists of seven information
elements, which can be opened and closed separately. We
show that participants choose different information elements
depending on their self-assessed market knowledge. We are
able to distinguish between trading performance and behav-
iour and thereby provide novel insights into the interplay
between interface, information and decision making.
Surprisingly, we find that on average an increase in the
number of open information elements reduces trading perfor-
mance. An explanation for this observation may lie in cogni-
tive theory. Complexity increases the participants’ informa-
tion load and hence can reduce decision accuracy (Malhotra
1982).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the
second section presents a review of related work in the
(market) user interface domain. Additionally, a short introduc-
tion to prediction markets is given. The third section details
the field experiment setting and the framing of the partici-
pants’ trading process. The subsequent section first presents
some descriptive data and then introduces the evaluation
methodology. Specifically, we use market measures to sepa-
rately analyse trading performance and trading behaviour. In
section six we link the interface elements to trading outcome
and interpret the results. Finally, section seven concludes this
paper.
Related Work
In the following section we will first present related work in
the market interface design domain as well as a short section
on effect of information displays on decision process. Both
sections motivate our explorative approach on studying mar-
ket interfaces. We then introduce related work in the predic-
tion market area to provide some background of our experi-
mental setting.
Market Interface Design
A fundamental assumption of many market designers is that
participants are sophisticated and bounded rational. Hence,
participants are able to express their expectations as bids and
understand the underlying implications. As a consequence
designers have developed mechanisms that are theoretically
efficient if participants are perfectly rational (Maskin 2008).
Assuming a perfectly rational participant, designing the mar-
ket interface is just a means of presenting the mechanism. In
this line of reasoning oftentimes the market interface is used to
present as much information as possible to support the trading
process. However, it is well known that individuals are
bounded rational (Simon 1997) and might not be able to
cognitively handle all available information. This leads to
the question, which information supports trading decision
and which information distracts them.
Challenged by the rise of complex markets (e.g. Energy or
P2P resource sharing, sports betting platforms) in which non-
sophisticated users find it hard to interact, Seuken et al.
(2010a) proposed the idea of Hidden Market Design. ‘The
primary goal […] is to find the right trade-off between hiding
or reducing some of the market complexities while maximizing
economic efficiency attained in equilibrium.’Hence, the goal
is to lower the entrance barriers (e.g. market complexities)
for non-sophisticated users to participate in markets. The
simplification can be achieved by either changing the user
interface or adapting the market rules. Following that
idea, they design a market-based P2P backup application
(Seuken et al. 2010b; Seuken et al. 2012). In these papers
they address both aspects: the user interface eliciting
participants’ preferences and the market rules, standardiz-
ing the market interaction.
In a field experiment, Teschner and Weinhardt (2011)
evaluate three different interfaces, ranging from an interface
that provides the market participants with the maximum
amount of information, to a maximally hidden interface, that
hides most of the complexities from the users. Testing the idea
of Hidden Market Design they find that those market partic-
ipants that use the hidden market interface are more likely to
make profitable trades. The study strongly suggests
redesigning standard market interfaces.
Decision Processes in Trading Environments
There are various studies on individual trading behaviour and
decision making in financial markets (e.g. De Bondt 1998).
They focus on excess trading (e.g. Barber and Odean 2000),
the effect of experience or IQ on trading performance (e.g.
Grinblatt et al. 2012) as well as the disposition effect (e.g.
Odean 1998).
But to our knowledge there exists no empirical work
on decision processes in trading environments with fo-
cus on the trading interface. Kauffman and L. Diamond
(1990) highlight the importance of research on behav-
ioural decision making and information presentation ef-
fects. They examine how behavioural effects may be-
come operative in screen-based securities and foreign
exchange trading activities, where users can choose
among information presentation formats which should
support trader decision making. They present a model
to identify where and how information, heuristics and
biases might affect decision making in the trading
environment.
In the domains of decision support systems and online
shopping environments the influence of the interface on
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decision behaviour has been repeatedly demonstrated.
Kleinmuntz and Schkade (1993) find that information dis-
plays influence decision processes by facilitating some deci-
sion strategies while hindering others. Decision makers bal-
ance the desire to maximize accuracy against the desire to
minimize effort. Investigating the relationship between prob-
lem representation and task type in information acquisition,
Vessey (1991) develops the cognitive fit theory. This theory
proposes that a correspondence between task and information
presentation leads to superior task performance for individual
users. In several studies, cognitive fit theory has provided an
explanation for performance differences among users across
different presentation formats such as tables, graphs, and
schematic faces (Vessey 1994; Vessey and Galletta 1991).
Additionally, they show that increasing interface flexibility
instead of an informed choice of display format may be
harmful rather than helpful to the problem solver. Similarly
Speier and Morris (2003) compare the use of visual and text-
based interfaces for low and high complexity tasks. They find
that participants perform better in low-complexity environ-
ments by using text-based query tools. However, in the high-
complexity environments participants perform better with
visual support. Turning to the optimal pool of available infor-
mation in decision support systems, empirical work has
shown that users can handle only a certain amount of data.
Malhotra (1982) concludes that individuals cannot optimally
handle more than 10 information items or attributes simulta-
neously. Testing decision accuracy Streufert et al. (1967)
show that as information load increases, decision mak-
ing first increases, reaches an optimum (information
load ten) and then decreases. Finally, in an interactive
home shopping simulation Ariely (2000) tested how the
participants’ control over information influences their
utilization of this information. He compared four set-
tings; if information control was high/low and the task
complexity was high/low. He finds that increased con-
trol over information leads to better performance in
tasks with low complexity and lower performance in
the high complexity setting. He reasoned, that for par-
ticipants in the low complexity setting, when demand
on processing resources is low, more information is
beneficial. In complex situations however the informa-
tion is detrimental to performance due to the additional
burden of selecting the right information (Ariely 2000).
He concludes, that when cognitive load is high (when
the task is novel or difficult) high information control
can be harmful.
To summarize previous work, the amount and control of
information, as well as the information representation does
influence user behaviour. On the one hand, information con-
trol improves performance by improving the fit between ac-
tions and outcomes. On the other hand, in terms of cost
(disadvantages), information control requires the user to invest
processing resources in managing the information amount
and flow. As a conclusion, information control has both
positive and negative effects on performance. The two
tasks of processing and managing information are related
and co-dependent. Moreover literature has repeatedly
shown that too much information leads to cognitive over-
load resulting in decreased decision performance. As a
consequence we rely on information systems to filter,
aggregate and present this information in a manner that
supports the decision making process. Thus far there are
no guidelines on what information is needed to support
trading decisions. In order to create such guidelines, one
needs to understand which information elements support
and which elements hinder the individual trading process.
Moreover, as individuals have different informational
needs and vary in experience, it seems fruitful to develop
customized market interfaces. We analyse decision perfor-
mance and behaviour in a market experiment setting,
namely a prediction market.
Prediction Markets for Economic Outcomes
Prediction markets have a long track record of successful
application in a wide area ranging from political to sport
events, sometimes outperforming established forecasting
methods (Berg et al. 2008; Goel et al. 2010; Luckner et al.
2008). They facilitate and support decision making through
aggregating expectations about events (Hahn and Tetlock
2006). The roots of their predictive power are twofold; the
market provides the incentives for traders to truthfully disclose
their information and an algorithm to weight opinions (Arrow
et al. 2008). They facilitate and support decision making
through aggregating expectations about events (Berg and
Rietz 2003; Hahn and Tetlock 2006; Hanson 1999). Mostly
a simple continuous double auction is used as a market mech-
anism - similar to most conventional stock markets. Also
comparable to financial markets, participants buy a stock if
they find that prices underestimate the event in question and
they sell a stock if they find that prices overestimate the
probability of the said event.
In 2002, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank created a
market to predict macro-economic outcomes such as ISM
Manufacturing, change in Non-Farm Payrolls, Initial Jobless
Claims and consumer price index (Gadanecz et al. 2007). By
analysing the forecast efficiency, Gurkaynak and Wolfers
(2006) find that market-generated forecasts are very similar
but more accurate than survey-based forecasts. Similarly, in an
attempt to forecast inflation changes in Germany and
Bulgaria, Berlemann and Nelson (2005) and Berlemann
et al. (2005) set up a series of markets. However, in their field
experiments participation is quite low and forecasts results are
mixed but promising.
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Experiment Setting: An Economic Indicator Exchange
In October 2009 we launched a play money prediction
market designed to forecast economic indicators such as
GDP, inflation, investments, export and unemployment
figures in Germany. The goal was to forecast the indica-
tors over longer time periods in advance and continuously
aggregate economic information. The market called
Economic Indicator Exchange (EIX) was launched in
cooperation with the leading German economic
newspaper’Handelsblatt’. The cooperation aimed at
reaching a wide and well-informed audience interested
in financial markets and economic development. We thus
expected no problems understanding the indicators and
the concept of trading. The market was publicly available
over the Internet and readers were actively invited to join.
Besides online documentation there was no further train-
ing on how to use the system.
Market and Contract Design
The market design features a continuous double auction with-
out a designated market maker. After registration participants
are endowed with 1,000 stocks of each contract and 100,000
play money units. Participants are allowed to submit market-
able limit orders with 0.01 play money units increments
through the web-based interface. The economic indicators
tradable on the market are a mix of leading (forecasting the
economy, e.g. investments) and lagging (describing the state
of the economy, e.g. unemployment numbers) economic in-
dicators. To facilitate longer forecast horizons every indicator
is represented by three independent stocks each representing
the next three data releases (e.g., “Inv Jan 2010”, “Inv Feb
2010”, “Inv Mar 2010, in case of investments). As a conse-
quence, the initial forecast periods vary from 1 month for
monthly released indicators up to 3 quarters for quarterly
released variables. One day before the release date the trading
in the concerned stock is stopped. As soon as the trading in
one stock stops a new stock of the same indicator (e.g., “Inv
Apr 2010”, when “Inv Jan 2010” is released) is intro-
duced into the market. This means that participants
receive 1,000 stocks of the respective indicator. As soon
as the final value for the recently closed indicator is
released, it is paid out. Consequently, all in all partici-
pants are able to continuously trade 18 stocks at all
times. Due to the legal restrictions on gambling, the
EIX prediction market could not be operated with real
money and can thus be described as a free to join play
money market. As previous research in the field of
prediction markets has shown that play money perform
as well as real money markets predicting future events
(Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004; Wolfers and Zitzewitz
2004), we did not expect negative implications on
predictive performance due to that design choice. To
increase participants’ motivation and to provide incen-
tives to truly reveal information we hand out prizes
worth € 36,000. Prices were shuffled among participants
rewarding good performance.
Participant Demographics
The registration at the EIX-market is free and requires just
minimal personal information. However, participants had to
report their full name, address, gender, and birthday to qualify
for prizes. Thus, 1180 of 1235 registered participants decided
to report these dates (96 %). They are predominantly male
(93%)which could bias the results of this study. Their average
age is 53 years. Additionally, upon registration we asked
participants to self-assess their market knowledge and their
knowledge of the German economy. Furthermore, participants
indicate if they are working in areas related to exchanges or
economic forecasting; with 37.16 % indicating that they do.
The user input is highly correlated (ρ = 0.74), meaning that
participants indicating high knowledge in the market domain
do the same in the economic domain.
Trading Interface
The trading interface is displayed in Fig. 1. Participants have
convenient access to the order book (I1) with 10 levels of
visible order book depth, the price chart (I2), the account
information (I3) and market information (I4) such as the last
trading day. As additional information the Handelsblatt pro-
vides access to an up-to-date economic news stream (I5) and
finally the indicator’s last year’s performance is displayed (I6).
In the second round, we added a panel to display a list of
previous orders (I7).
Participants are able to customize their trading inter-
face individually throughout the market runtime. By
clicking on the small arrows on the upper left of each
box, the seven information panels open and close. In
the default setting, only the trading mask and the seven
headlines are visible. After each submitted order the
chosen interface is saved with the order as well as in
the user profile. On user’s return, the system opens the
previously used interface elements by default. The ad-
vantage is twofold; firstly, users have a convenient
option to customize their trading experience, secondly
we can assess which self-selected information pieces
have influenced the participants’ decision processes.
Additionally, we did not have to form treatment groups
with different interfaces and assign users to certain
groups, since such a setting would possibly create an
unfair experience.
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Research Model
As more trading decisions are facilitated through (web-based)
trading support systems one of the most urging questions is
how to design such interfaces. In order to answer this higher
research question we have to deeply understand if and how
different interfaces influence trading behaviour and perfor-
mance.More specifically, we need to analyse how participants
search for information and how they incorporate this informa-
tion in their trading process. To give indications for these
research questions, we start by analysing the participants’
trading behaviour and how the resulting trading performance
is correlated with the trading interface (i.e. different interface
elements) (Fig. 2). In the first step we analyse how participants
individually customize their user interface. From another per-
spective we analyse which information different participants
regard as useful. On one hand, all information might help the
users to trade better and improve their decisions. On the other
hand, no interface panel can be regarded as indispensable in
order to trade. Therefore, we have to analyse which interface
elements are regarded worth considering in the trading
process. Following Ariely (2000) we assume that participants
choose different information elements as they try to adapt the
interface to their informational needs. We expect users who
are familiar with market environments to use more informa-
tion elements (H1). Users with no market experience might
feel confused by too much information and hence reduce the
interface to the simple basics.
In a second step, we present how the self-chosen inter-
face influences participants’ trading behaviour. As all
traders have the same portfolio at the beginning, the size
of a trade is a proxy for the trader’s confidence perception
(Harris 2002). Assuming that participants using more
information (a high number of open information ele-
ments) are more confident about how to trade, it seems
reasonable that the resulting order size is on average
higher (H2). Another individual market behaviour is
how participants submit their orders. We distinguish be-
tween market orders (which trade instantaneously against
a standing limit order) and limit orders. Therefore, the
trader submitting a market order pays the effective spread
in order to execute directly, knowing that the order will be
Fig. 1 Trading Screen with open information panels (I1-I7)
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executed. A less confident trader wants to keep the effec-
tive spread and posts limit orders. We hypothesize that
traders using more information are more confident about
their decision and submit market orders (H2).
Finally and most importantly, we analyse how the self-
chosen interface influences the participants’ trading perfor-
mance (H3). Starting from a ‘base load’ of information, we try
to identify the influence of additional information, i.e. the
number of open interface elements as well as the interface
type (I1-I7). The intuitive assumption is: the more informa-
tion, the better the decision accuracy. Hence, a higher number
of open information elements leads to a better trading
performance. As presented, previous work suggests that
decision accuracy might suffer if the information load is
too high or the control of information distracts from the
problem’s solution (Malhotra 1982). Therefore, alterna-
tively too much information reduces decision accuracy
and thus trading performance.
In combination, these three steps provide a first recognition
of a market interface’s impact on trader behaviour.
Moreover they provide insight, how a market interface
affects individual trading behaviour and subsequently
trading performance.
Data and Methodology
The following section first presents some descriptive market
statistics and then details the methods to systematically ana-
lyse the effect of different trading interfaces on trading
behaviour.
Descriptive Statistics
The following data includes the timespan from 2009/10/
30 until 2011/10/31. In total 1,235 participants registered
at the EIX market, of those 824 submitted at least one
order. We discard all stocks with less than 50 transactions.
Altogether participants submitted 79,334 orders resulting
in 34,028 executed transactions. Previous work showed
that the market-generated forecasts performed well in
comparison to the’Bloomberg’-survey forecasts, the in-
dustry standard (Teschner et al. 2011a; Teschner et al.
2011b). For every order we record the open interfaces
(I1-I7, see Fig. 1). An interface variable is 1 when the
element (I1-I7 Fig. 1) is open when submitting an order
otherwise it is 0. In our field experiment we asked partic-
ipants to self-assess their market knowledge on a scale
from 1 (very good) to 6 (very poor). According to their
rating we cluster the participants P by median into two
groups: the good (MKp=1) and the not good (MKp=0)
market knowledge groups.
Measuring Trading Behaviour and Performance
In our continuous market we observe the outcome, i.e. the
fundamental value of each stock. Therefore we can ex post
measure the information content of each order. If an order
moved the price in the right direction with respect to the final
outcome of the stock, it is informed; whereas an order moving
the price in the opposite direction with respect to the final
outcome price, it is considered uninformed. In other words,
the order is either profitable or not. In order to capture how the
number of open elements impacts the submitted quantity we
use the following OLS regression:
Quantityo ¼ αþ β 
X
i¼1
7
I i;o þ γ MKp þ
X
j¼1
5
δ j M j
 
ð1Þ
We relate the quantity of a specific order o to the number of
open interfaces Ii,o. Please note, that we cannot assess, wheth-
er that information was actually used in the particular trading
decision. However, the results won’t suffer as this research
focuses primary on the presentation of information. By intro-
ducing one market dummy (M1 – M5) for each group of
related indicators (e.g. one market dummy for export indica-
tors, one for inflation indicators, etc.), we control for the
different historic variances, similar groups of indicators ex-
hibited in the past (e.g. exports are much more volatile than
inflation). Similarly to control for the self-assessed market
Fig. 2 ResearchModel (based on
van Witteloostuijn and Muehlfeld
(2008))
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knowledge we add a market knowledge dummy (MK). The
control variables are included in all presented regressions.
To identify the influence of individual interface elements
on the submitted quantity, we use the following OLS
regression:
Quantityo ¼ αþ
X
i¼1
7
βi  I i;o
 þ γ MKp þ
X
j¼1
5
δ j M j
 
ð2Þ
Besides the β-placement Eqs. 1 and 2 are equal.
For the second proxy, we look at how users submit their
offers. For an executed trade there are only two possibilities;
either an order is a limit order or it is a market order. The
market order initializes a trade against a standing limit order.
As this is a binary outcome we use a binomial logistic regres-
sion. If a trade is initializing, which means it is market making,
the dependent variable is 1 otherwise it is 0. Equation 3
measures the influence of the number of open interfaces on
the probability whether a trade is initializing or passive.
log
πInit
πTrade
¼ αþ β 
X
i¼1
7
I i;o þ γ MKp þ
X
j¼1
5
δ j M j
 
ð3Þ
log
πInit
πTrade
¼ αþ
X
i¼1
7
βi  I i;o
 þ γ MKp þ
X
j¼1
5
δ j M j
 
ð4Þ
In order to calculate the influence of each individual inter-
face on an order’s type, we use a Logit-regression (see Eq. 4).
Finally, for the trading-performance measures we
adapt Eqs. 3 and 4 by replacing the dependent variable.
The dependent variable is 1 if the order is profitable
otherwise it is 0.
log
πProfitability
πTrade
¼ αþ
X
i¼1
7
βi  I i;o
 þ γ MKp þ
X
j¼1
5
δ j M j
 ð5Þ
Results
In this section we will show that participants choose different
information elements to support their trading. Moreover, in-
dividual behaviour differs depending on the interface elements
used. Controlling for different trading behaviour, we find that
market participants using a lower number of open interfaces
are more likely to submit profitable orders.
Customizing the Trading Interface
Following the presented research model, we start by analysing
how traders customize their trading interfaces. Table 1 shows
how self-assessed market knowledge and interface choice are
related. Participants with “Good” self-assessed market knowl-
edge use the order book (I1), the price chart (I2), the market
(I4) and the historic values (I6) more often than the
other participants. Thus in general it seems that experi-
enced market participants customize their markets inter-
faces differently than inexperienced participants. Turning
to the first step, we find that the number of open
interfaces on average is higher (3.04 vs. 2.89; t-stat.:
8.9; p-value <0.1 %) for users with good market knowl-
edge self-assessment.
Result 1: Participants make use of the functionality to cus-
tomize their market interfaces.
Result 2: Experienced participants use more information to
inform their trading decision.
Trading Behaviour
A commonly used proxy for confidence in trading envi-
ronments is the submitted quantity. As stated above, we
hypothesized that participants with a high number of open
information elements are more confident about their trad-
ing decision and thus submit orders with a higher quanti-
ty. As presented in Table 2, Model A, the opposite is the
case; the higher the number of open interfaces the lower
the submitted quantity. Investigating further which inter-
face elements drive the quantity decision, we regress the
submitted quantity on individually information elements
(Eq. 3). Table 3, Model D shows the results. The order
book, the price chart, account information and the previ-
ous order elements have an increasing effect. Also, we
assumed that participants with more information would be
more confident and hence submit more market orders. As
the estimates in in Table 2, Model B show, this is not the
case. The higher the number of open information inter-
faces, the lower the chance that participants submit mar-
ket orders. We follow that a high number of open inter-
faces results in a higher chance of the participants to
submit limit orders. Thus, one can interpret that
Table 1 Market Knowledge and Interface Choice
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7
Good 95 % 38 % 40 % 48 % 16 % 43 % 53 %
Not Good 89 % 33 % 42 % 44 % 20 % 40 % 53 %
Difference
(t-stat.)
6***
(6.2)
5***
(9.9)
-2***
(-4.1)
4***
(11.2)
-4***
(-8.7)
3***
(6.9)
0
(0.8)
The percentages indicate how often a particular interface was open
before an order was submitted. (The superscript ‘***’ denotes signifi-
cance at the 0.1 % level.)
Customizable Market Interfaces and Trading Performance 331
participants with a higher number of interfaces act more
cautiously and submit limit orders, keeping the possible
realized spread. Looking at how individual interfaces
influence the order-type; Table 3, Model E, shows that
only an open news interface (I5) correlates with a higher
chance of submitting market orders. The market informa-
tion element (I4) renders the participants more cautious.
Taking the two proxies together, we conclude that trading
confidence is reduced the more information participants
use. It seems that participants independent from their
experience rely their trading decision on more information
elements in situations in which they are not 100 %
confident.
Result 3: A high number of open interfaces lead to orders
with decreased confidence (lower volume and
more limit orders)
Trading Performance
We suggested two dissenting outcomes regarding the
interface influence on decision accuracy (H3). One might
intuitively suspect that a higher number of information
panels correlates with better trading decisions. Turning to
Table 2, Model C reveals that the chance of submitting a
profitable order is lower with an increasing number of
information panels. Interestingly looking at the interface
elements supporting successful trading, it turns out that
the order book, market information and the previous
order element have a positive effect (Table 3, Model
F). In contrast the price chart does not actually help in
the decision-making process but seems to distract partici-
pants. A possible explanation might be, that participants
over-rate the past price process and under-rate their cur-
rent information about the state of the economy. This is
in line with Mussweiler and Schneller (2003) who show
that charts depicting past stock prices influence investing
decisions. While their work showed the effect in a closed
laboratory setting our results generalizes the effect to a
multifaceted field experiment. Moreover these results
coincide with Fama (1991), that it is not possible to
consistently increase trading performance by using
Table 2 The Influence of the Number of Open Interfaces
Dependent Trading Behavior Performance
Variable Quantity Order-type Profitability
(t-stat.) (χ2) (χ2)
Model A Model B Model C
Qualityo Inito Scoreo
Number of Interfaces −84.26*** −0.07*** −0.04***
(−12.24) (−215.43) (−78.60)
Market Knowledge −5.36 −0.29*** 0.08***
(−0.17) (−213.35) (17.90)
R² 0.003 – –
AIC – 31,637 32,048
Model A presents the values for the OLS quantity regression (Eq. 1). The
estimates show that if the number of interfaces is increased (e.g. from 2 to
3) the submitted quantity per order is reduced by 84.26. As Model B and
C are Logit-regressions (Eq. 3), the interpretation of the estimates is
different. They represent the change in the log-odds of the outcome for a
one-unit increase in the predictor variable. The chance that an order is a
market order or profitable is reduced with the number of open interface
elements. (The superscript’***’ denotes significance at the 0.1 %,’**’ at
the 1 %, ‘*’ at the 5 % level.)
We ran the same model using a factor coding for variable Number of
Interfaces in order to check for non-linear (e.g. U-shaped) relationship.
The results are consistent with assuming a linear relationship in contrast
to Streufert et al. (1967)
Table 3 The Effect of Customizing Interfaces
Trading Behavior Performance
Dependent Quantity Order-type Profitability
Variable (t-Stat.) (χ2) (χ2)
Model D Model E Model F
Qualityo Inito Scoreo
I1 (order book) 377.34*** −0.04 0.20**
(5.10) (0.59) (7.40)
I2 (price chart) 297.52*** 0.04 −0.37**
(8.20) (1.17) (−93.54)
I3 (account information) 167.9** −0.05 −0.07
(3.50) (0.75) (1.97)
I4 (market information) −403*** −0.25*** 0.11*
(−8.40) (−21.15) (4.04)
I5 (news) −351.62*** 0.3*** 0.01
(−7.50) (36.22) (0.08)
I6 (historic values) −319.07*** 0.04** 0.04
(−5.59) (5.83) (0.99)
I7 (previous orders) 204.88*** 0.01 0.11**
(5.00) (0.01) (5.56)
Market −68.57* −0.27*** 0.2***
Knowledge (−2.00) (−58.00) (32.84)
R² 0.007 – –
AIC – 31,549 31,974
Model D gives the values for the detailed interface-quantity regression
(eq. 3). The estimates show how the submitted quantity per order is
affected, if a specific interface is open (e.g. If the order book (I1) is open
the submitted quantity is increased by 297.52 units). As Model E and D
are Logit-regressions (Eq. 5) thus the estimates represent the change in
the log-odds of the outcome for a one unit increase in the predictor
variable. The chance that an order is a market order and is profitable
is reduced/increased with specific interfaces being open. (The super-
script’***’ denotes significance at the 0.1 %,’**’ at the 1 % level, ‘*’ at
the 5 % level.)
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information open to the public. Even though our market
setting is a play money prediction market his prediction
holds. Participants using certain elements (price chart)
anchor their trading decision on irrelevant information
and loose on average. Nevertheless, this result might
not generalize to more sophisticated markets or market
participants that are used to carefully attribute impor-
tance to a price chart.
In general when designing the market interface the goal
was to support the participants to make good forecasts and
consequently make good decisions. As the really helpful
information elements can only be identified ex post this result
suggests reworking the interface design and removing the
price chart from the trading interface.
Result 4: A high number of open interfaces lead to orders
with decreased trading performance.
Result 5: If participants see the price chart their trading
performance suffers.
Conclusion and Implications
Various allocation problems call for market based solutions.
However, market complexities impose high entry barriers for
non-sophisticated users. One reason is that in markets prefer-
ences are usually communicated through bids and offers,
which require participants to adapt to a different mental mod-
el. Recently, researchers proposed the idea of hidden market
design, which merges the fields of market design with user
interface design in order to make complex markets accessible
to a broader audience. As more trading decisions are facilitat-
ed through (web-based)’trading support systems’ one of the
most urging questions is how to design such interfaces.
Moreover, it is important to design such interfaces without
reducing market efficiency and individual trading perfor-
mance. In our field experiment participants trade in a complex
prediction market, which closely resembles trading in finan-
cial markets. As the outcome of events in predictionmarkets is
finally known, we can ex post measure the participants’ trad-
ing performance. In our market setting, participants can indi-
vidually customize their interface. We show that participants
choose different information elements depending on their self-
assessed market knowledge. Apparently, market participants
try to fit the interface to their individual internal problem
representation. Yet the individual motivation of the interface
choice remains unclear.
We show that presenting more information does not im-
prove decision making but rather decreases trading perfor-
mance. From the results presented, one might follow that
information accessible on the interface does not help forecast-
ing economic variables and hence the participants’ decision-
making. Another interpretation, which is in line with previous
work, can be found in cognitive theory. As Malhotra (1982)
shows, “too much” information leads to information overload,
which reduces decision accuracy and may also reduce deci-
sion confidence. Thus a high number of interface elements (a
lot of displayed information) increases complexity and dis-
tracts from good decision making. As participants are able to
customize their interface they seem unaware of the negative
influence of the interface on their decisions. As a conse-
quence, market designers should not only limit the amount
of presented information but also make a validated guess
about which information is useful. One clear market design
implication is that the chart depicting past prices does distract
participants. Even though it is one of the most common
features of market interfaces (retail broker interfaces or trading
desks) we see that participants actively choosing to see the
chart lose on average. On the other hand, participants viewing
the chart use an increased order size. Market operators who
gain by the higher volume should hence clearly make the chart
a prominent, default feature of the trading experience. One
element that is “good” for both market operators and market
participants is the order book. Participants using the order
book gain above average and they submit more volume as
well.
This work provides insight into the interplay between
interface, information and trading behaviour. However, the
research setting in this work has known drawbacks. First of
all, the participants’ self-assessed market knowledge is a sub-
jective measure. Secondly, participants were allowed to cus-
tomize their interface by themselves. As a next step, one
should randomize participants in pre-defined interface groups
to validate our findings. Another promising approach is to
rerun the presented field study in as a slightly modified labo-
ratory experiment, where participants cannot modify the in-
terfaces themself. By stepwise iterating different combinations
of information elements and with the aid of eye-tracking
systems, participants’ actual information usage, and thus a
proxy for participants’ information-processing effort, could
be derived. Moreover, future research might address the
non-linear relationship between information load and decision
making pointed out by Streufert et al. (1967). However, we
hope this work provides a good starting point for practitioners
and researchers designing markets and their interfaces.
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